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"CORRIDOR-ISING" IMPACT
ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD:
Is the Newly Operational
China-Laos Railway a
Game-Changer?
BY XIANGMING CHEN

On 3 December 2021, amid the global
surge of the Omicron variant, the
China-Laos Railway (CLR), under
construction since 2016, launched
its maiden run from and toward its
two termini at Kunming, capital city
of Yunnan province in south-western
China, and Vientiane, capital city of
Laos. In more ways than one, the CLR
is an unprecedented cross-border
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rail project in terms of scale, length,
connected places, construction type,
and potentially massive regional
impact. These features exemplify
the growing influence of the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) along its six
large-scale economic corridors and
their key sub-corridors. In this essay,
I explore the connective effects of
the CLR using combined evidence on

its late construction and early operation to illustrate the BRI’s broader
“corridor-ising” impact.

O

n 3 December 2021, Chinese
President Xi Jinping and Lao
President Thongloun Sisoulith, both also General Secretaries
of the two countries’ ruling parties,
appeared simultaneously on two giant screens to call the China-Laos
Railway (CLR) into its inaugural run
from Kunming and Vientiane toward
each other (see Figure 1). Xi lauded
the CLR as an iconic project under
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
launched in 2013, that will open up
new spaces for trade and development along the train route. He added his hope that a number of Lao
students studying rail engineering in
Shanghai would apply their learning
to driving and maintaining the CLR.
Thongloun thanked China for ending
the era of “no trains” that turns landlocked Laos (the only such country in
Southeast Asia) into "land-linked" as

Featured photo: The Lane Xang EMU train passes by the China-

FEBRUARY - MARCH 2022 Laos borderline inside a tunnel, Oct 15, 2021. [Photo/Xinhua]

a result of connecting with the BRI as a docking
node. He added that the CLR marks a milestone
in the infrastructure development of Laos.1
The CLR’s ceremonial opening aside, this
highest official blessing conveyed the historic
importance that both China and Laos attach to the
CLR for what it is planned and projected to deliver,
not only for both countries but also beyond their
linked national territories. As the CLR’s regional
impact is surfacing, the broader force motivating the CLR has become more noticeable
along the BRI’s six economic corridors extending
from China to its neighbouring countries and
far beyond (see Figure 2). The China-Indochina
Peninsula Corridor (No. 4 in Figure 2) includes
the China-Laos Economic Corridor, whose
connective spine is the CLR. The BRI corridors
have unleashed an era of corridor-ising regionalisation, adding new trans-local dimensions to the
geography of economic globalisation, carrying
important geo-economic and geopolitical repercussions. Are the BRI corridors really new? As
they take shape and exert influence near and far,
it is important to look at their intellectual origin,
if it exists, to understand their unfolding impact.
CORRIDOR-ISATION, OLD AND NEW
While regional development along an urban-economic corridor is not new, corridor-shaped
regionalisation has taken on new and larger scales
involving more powerful actors since the BRI.
By promoting six cross-border economic corridors stretching from deep inside China to nearby
and faraway countries and cities, the Chinese
government has activated some latent conditions
and forces spread along given and newly built
transport corridors to produce previously non-extant opportunities and challenges for local and
regional development.
Corridor-ising regionalisation could be traced
back to the emergence of urban and metropolitan extensions beyond local administrative
boundaries in advanced economies in the early
1960s, if not earlier. Linear pattern and transport infrastructure are two defining features of
urban corridors, which often involve two other
axes – of economic development and urbanisation – as a tripartite bundling that links two or
more city-regions. Besides their generic linear

Figure 1: Presidents Xi And Thonloun Preside Over The Launch
Of The China-Laos Railway, December 3, 2021

Source: Xinhua News Agency photo published on the Yunnan Province Website;
accessed at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/S5aSoZAq2qLpowdgyB7Srg.

Figure 2: The Six Belt And Road Regional Economic Corridors

Source: GISreportsonline.com; published with permission in Chen (2020: Figure 1.1)
and republished here.

structure, urban corridors exhibit such network
attributes as poles at either end, nodes between
two poles, and intermediate points serving as
secondary hubs. These salient features also
reflect the vertical and horizontal relations of
some regional and global infrastructure-led
economic systems of a corridor shape.
Georg, Blaschke, and Taubenböck (2016) identified 67 urban corridors in the world (see Figure 3).
They are typically between 400 km and 1,200 km
long and 70 to 200 km wide, with a length-to-width
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Figure 3: A Global Inventory Of 67 Urban Corridors

Source: Georg, Blaschke, and Taubenböck (2016: Figure 7).

ratio of between four and ten. They are generally
shorter than the six BRI corridors, as the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (No. 6 in Figure 2)
runs over 3,000 km from Gwadar, Pakistan to
Kashgar, Xinjiang, although the width of the BRI
corridors is numerically vague, due to a lack of
clear measuring criteria. About 95 per cent of
those 67 urban corridors begin and end within
national territories, such as the classic case of the
Boston-Washington (BosWash) corridor along
the US eastern seaboard (No. 12 in Figure 3),
while all six BRI corridors span multiple national
borders and remote border cities. In addition,
approximately 60 per cent of the 67 urban corridors are anchored to and pass through two or
more major national and international centres
and their relatively well-integrated immediate
hinterlands in advanced economies, like the
so-called “Blue Banana” corridor through several
Western European countries (No. 57 in Figure
3). However, the six BRI corridors traverse
mostly less developed countries and cities with
their surrounding regions. Finally, most urban
corridors are market-induced with very limited
formal national and subnational planning and

Urban and economic corridors
cannot develop sustainably without
powerful and supportive transport
infrastructure as their backbones.
6
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relatively little intercity or trans-local coordination. The BRI corridors, however, are purposely
initiated by the Chinese state and its planned
and built infrastructure projects across international boundaries.
Rail Development as China’s Statecraft
Urban and economic corridors cannot develop
sustainably without powerful and supportive
transport infrastructure as their backbones. The
BRI corridors, for most of their sections, have
been shaped by Chinese-built large-scale transport infrastructures, including bridges, ports,
roadways, and railways that connect Chinese
and international cities and regions across
borders. Of these types of transport infrastructures, railway development and construction
has taken on the largest-scale and most powerful
role in linking cities in China’s national urban
system and across its diverse regional spaces
with increasing cross-border connections. By the
same token, China’s rail development manifests
three components spanning its domestic-international divide that empower the BRI corridors
and a number of their sub-corridors.
The first strength of China’s rail development
“going global” originates from its domestic
root of technological learning. In the 1990s,
the Chinese government’s targeted investment
in high-speed train (HST) bundled technology
ushered in the first stage of rail development
featuring technology accumulation before
2004. It laid a solid foundation for older HST
technology, while still trailing international
leaders. During the second stage (2004-8),
China focused on importing and digesting technologies from European and Japanese rail
companies and succeeded in incorporating
them into the manufacturing of Chinese trains
that could run at over 200 km per hour. The
innovation-focused third stage (2008-12) led to
the construction of faster trains, culminating in
the introduction of the CRH (China Rail HighSpeed) 380 train to the Beijing-Shanghai line,
which could top 400 km per hour. Since 2012,
China has improved HST design and production to its own integrated standard, which
resulted in completing a number of long rail
lines through varied climatic and topographic

terrains (Xu 2017). China has also begun to
“export” train development such as the CLR.
Secondly, China has gained tremendous
experience and expertise from having built
an extensive national system of freight and
passenger train routes, including a massive
intercity high-speed train network reaching
a total length of around 40,000 km by the end
of 2021. In 2016, the Chinese government
unveiled a more ambitious goal of completing
eight vertical (north-south) and horizontal
(east-west) HST trunk routes covering much
of the country, except a portion of the western
region (Chen 2021a). China reached a peak
of HST construction after launching the
2,298-km Beijing-Guangzhou line in 2012, the
world’s longest HST route at the time, through
complex subtropical terrains, followed by the
2,258-km Shanghai-Kunming line through
long tunnels and over elevated bridges in
the mountainous south-west in 2016. I made
the 11-hour journey on this last route in 2018
and passed over the world’s longest concretearch rail bridge over the vast gorge separating
Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. This combination of experience and expertise has prepared
China well for building the CLR over its own
challenging topographic terrains.
The Chinese state’s capacity for financing,
designing, and constructing railways as a
package, reinforced by the growing domestic
overcapacity, provides a third advantage in
building an overseas large-scale infrastructure
project like the CLR. Financing infrastructure
projects in developing countries has been
a top priority and strategy for the BRI since
2013. Technological learning and upgrading
in China’s HST sector has enabled its rail
engineering companies to design rail operating systems to high international standards
that can also be adapted to accommodating
the siting conditions and challenges in other
countries. Extensive HST construction has
nourished a large and long domestic supply
chain for construction equipment and materials, and thus enhanced the integrated
capacity of China’s state companies to build
rail projects outside China in a coordinated
and efficient manner.

China has gained
tremendous
experience and
expertise from
having built an
extensive national
system of freight
and passenger train
routes, including a
massive intercity
high-speed train
network reaching
a total length of
around 40,000 km
by the end of 2021.

Those three components together render
rail development a competitive statecraft of
the Chinese state that enables the generally
successful delivery of large-scale transport
infrastructure projects like the CLR. This
rail development statecraft allows China to
anchor and extend rail-driven economic and
logistics connections to cities and regions
along and adjacent to the BRI corridors.
One major example is that China has, since
2013, spun a large number of freight train
routes connecting several logistics hubs
and, indirectly, many other cities across its
coastal and interior regions and a myriad
of European cities and regions, as I documented recently in this magazine (Chen
2021b). In another case, China built the
760-km Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (ADR)
in 2017, linking landlocked Ethiopia and
Djibouti and its deep-water port on the Red
Sea (Chen 2020). Yet neither is comparable
to the CLR in terms of the high stakes associated with its construction cost, connective
power, consolidating effect on the economic
fortune of Laos, and consequential Southeast
Asian regional impact, especially in light
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) of 10 ASEAN countries
and five other members, including China,
becoming effective on 1 January 2022.
The CLR’s High Stakes, Long Reach, and
Strong Connectivity
The idea for the CLR germinated in 2010.
Due to domestic politics involving China’s
Minister of Transportation, the CLR did not
move forward until the end of 2014, when
the two governments signed the agreement
before the ground was broken for the project
in 2016. With an ambitious and complex
design, the CLR would carry passengers at 160
km per hour and freight at 120 km per hour
on standard-gauge tracks in one electrified
system across two national territories, with a
future extension to Thailand. The government
of Laos has placed the CLR at the heart of its
economic development strategy for unlocking
its landlocked position through the CLR’s
transformational domestic and transnational
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connections that can foster trade,
tourism, and other economic flows.
Against the Lao government’s
optimistic view of the CLR’s longterm economic benefits, the limited
research on the CLR has been more
critical of its financing and the negative construction-related effects on
labour, livelihood, and the environment. Concerns about the CLR’s
heavy debt burdens have emerged
from Laos’s share of the overall cost of
$5.9 billion, relative to $4.9 billion for
building the ADR. Laos is responsible
for providing $1.79 billion of capital,
including debt liability of $1.06 billion
and equity investment of $730 million,
$480 million of which had to be
borrowed from the Eximbank of China
(Chen and DiCarlo 2021). Related to
this huge hanging debt, the Lao state,
as the sovereign debtor, failed to put
the equity together on time, which led
to importing more Chinese workers
to replace the Lao workers who had
been promised to carry out the work
on the project (W. Chen 2020). The
CLR also suffered from a lack or
lag of monetary compensation for

8
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land acquisition and environmental
protection for the affected villages
along its route due to: 1) the disconnect between the enforcement of
environmental standards of China’s
international development and that of
the Lao government; and 2) discrepancies between the Lao central
government’s vision for the CLR as a
national priority and the provincial
and district governments’ obscure
roles in setting compensation rules
and implementing them (DiCarlo
2020; Suhardiman et al. 2021).
This critical work is confined to
the CLR’s pre-operation time, before
3 December 2021, and is thus unable
to address its early post-operation
situation. Using some combined
information about the CLR’s late
construction and early operation,
I explore the CLR’s different consequences at the local, regional,
national, and transnational levels.
Construction-Related Impact
The CLR stretches a little over 1,000
km, with about 600 km from Kunming
to Mohan on the border with Laos,
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and around 420 km from Vientiane to
the town of Boten, bordering Mohan.
It has 24 passenger stations along the
China segment and 10 stations for the
Lao segment, and 22 of these stations
also include freight yards and logistics
depots. The CLR passes through 93
tunnels and over 136 elevated bridges
within China, and 75 tunnels and 165
bridges inside Laos over its hilly north,
with a few of those bridges resembling the long and high bridge on the
Shanghai-Kunming Railway noted
earlier. The length of all the tunnels
and bridges adds up to 712 km, which
accounts for 76.5 per cent of the CLR’s
entire route. These construction challenges suited the rich expertise and
experience that the Chinese builders
brought over from having built so
much HST-driven transport infrastructure at home. For example, rail
engineering and hydropower drilling
companies used specialised heavy
equipment to drive the 17.4-km long
Wanhe Tunnel, the CLR’s longest, near
the city of Yuxi south of Kunming.
To electrify the track, the Chinese
builders have completed 937 km of

high-voltage lines linking 2,220 transmission towers snaking through the border,
with several hundred inside Laos. Chinese
engineers used the high-low combination
of legs to erect some transmission towers
without felling larger patches of trees.2 To
run the 1,677-km electrified train operating
system, Chinese engineers and workers put
in twenty 115-kilovolt power lines over 257
km, through 11 substation intervals, with 10
traction substations into the Laos State Grid,3
while the train’s operating power comes
from Laos’s abundant hydropower sources.
The CLR train was designed based on the
mature technology of China’s older Fuxing
bullet train to meet the CLR’s requirements
of slower speed, larger capacity, and lower
maintenance cost. In the meantime, China
has recently moved on to the newest, smart
Fuxing HST that can run at 350 km/hour on
such major routes as Beijing-Shanghai and
Beijing-Guangzhou. Jointly manufactured
by two subsidiaries of the China Railway
Rolling Stock Group Cooperation, which
ranked 349th among the Global 500 in 2021,
the CLR train was delivered in the red, blue,
and white colours of Laos’s national flag
before its launch (see Figure 4). It symbolises a technological adaptation to national
sovereignty and identity.
The CLR is an economically and logistically transformative transport artery that
opens up Laos from its landlocked position to
a land-linked one, while also allowing landlocked Yunnan province to access the sea
through Laos and Thailand. The CLR shortens
the train trip between Vientiane and Boten to
three hours from two days, while reducing the
journey from Mohan to Kunming to 5-6 hours.
This means that a traveller can depart either
Vientiane or Kunming in the morning and
reach the opposite terminus by evening, under
normal border-clearing conditions, or accomplish the whole trip overnight. Since goods used
to be transported slowly between China and
Laos by road, only good for small quantities,
or by expensive air shipping, the CLR is now
the happy medium carrying larger quantities
of goods, especially time-sensitive agricultural

Figure 4: The Newly Delivered China-Made Train
For The China-Laos Railway Before Its Launch

Source: A China News Agency photo.

goods, more cost-effectively.5
The CLR created over 110,000 jobs in Laos
cumulatively, including many Laos among the
6,000 engineers and workers putting up the
power transmission system at its peak. The CLR
also subcontracted the use of local construction materials worth around $80 million.
Its extended benefits from the construction
included 2,000 km of water irrigation along
the CLR’s feeder roads and around 3.1 million
square meters of green space around the train
stations and along the train route. In addition,
as part of the CLR, the Chinese government has
set up the Laos Rail Vocational Skills Academy
in Vientiane. Currently under construction,
this academy integrates facilities for administration, training, and residence, taking up
33,000 square metres of construction space. It
has already begun to train Lao train drivers and
engineers, some of whom had already received
basic training in China before the CLR began
operation.6 This marks the short- and longerterm transfer of knowledge and skills from
China to Laos to create and sustain localisation
of the CLR operation.
Early Post-Operation Impact
As these construction-related benefits have
sunk in, the early post-operation impact via
the CLR’s connective capacity has surfaced
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The CLR’s cargo content is
poised to diversify further and
thus enrich trade along the
CLR route and beyond.
from a ramping-up of its operating schedules. By
2 January 2022, just one month after its launch,
the CLR had run 64 passenger trains with 45,800
passengers from both Kunming and Vientiane
to the border, still under the pandemic closure
for human crossings. By January 17, 2022, 153
freight runs in both directions carried nearly
59,500 tons of cargo valued at $175 million and
covering around 100 types of products7, and many
of freight trains crossed the border after clearing
rigid custom and pandemic controls.
While trains from Kunming to the border town
of Mohan were full of passengers, especially those
travelling during the 2022 New Year Day holiday,
there were long lines of Laos buying tickets at the
Vientiane Station, where all boarding signs and
train schedules are available in Lao, Chinese, and
English. The on-site queuing for tickets raises a need
for an online portal for selling tickets. The secondand ordinary-class tickets for the Vientiane-Boten
trip cost around $30 and $21, respectively, not cheap
relative to Laos’s average income. The brisk ticket
sales thus far bode well for a sustainable demand for
the CLR passenger train. Booking orders for freight
wagons in both directions have also remained high.8
Given this early evidence of the CLR’s successful
launch, the Lao president gave an optimistic 2022
New Year greeting, proclaiming that Laos had
garnered a global spotlight for the CLR, and encouraging the country to use this railway fully to benefit
the national economy.9
Laos’s agricultural sector, with 60 per cent of
its work force, stands to benefit much from the
CLR. The Chinese government recently agreed
to import larger amounts of Laos’s main exports,
such as rubber, cows, rice, cassava, and tropical
fruits, like bananas and oranges, that could be
transported efficiently as bulk cargo by the CLR.
The paved feeder roads to the CLR stations from
nearby villages in northern Laos allow local

10
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farmers to tractor rice, cows, and fruit to the
stations for shipping to China. In 2021, Laos’s
exports to China as its largest trading partner
were led by bananas, worth $225 million, followed
by rubber, cassava, sugar cane, and water melons.
With a new bilateral agreement, Laos is planning
to export 50,000 tons of orange-like fruits, worth
$50 million, to China in 2022. These exports are
critical to sustaining Laos’s overall exports of $26.5
billion during 2016-20, with an annual growth of
10.10 per cent.9 As the CLR reduces the VientianeKunming shipping cost by 40-50 per cent, Laos’s
export of corn to China is projected to grow 20
per cent annually from the base of $1.7 billion in
2019 (World Bank 2020). The CLR helps sustain the
momentum of Laos’s exports to China.
The CLR is also facilitating bilateral trade
from the Chinese side. Guangzhou-based Asian
Potash International Co., which owns the mining
rights to a large potash mine in Gammon province, south-east of Vientiane, quickly booked the
first freight train from Vientiane to ship locally
manufactured potash fertiliser to China, and can
use the return train to transport materials and
equipment from China to expand local mining
and manufacturing in Laos. With growing
demand for its potash products in Yunnan and
neighbouring Guizhou province, this company is
planning to expand production for the regional
market in south-western China and will save
considerable time-cost over sea shipping
between southern China and Laos via Cambodian
and Thai ports, principally Sihanoukville and
Bangkok.11 A Yunnan-based rubber company
has also taken advantage of the early CLR
freight train to move its processed rubber from
Vientiane to China. Since 2005, this company
has invested $156 million in 21 rubber-producing
bases as a substitute for opium, covering 18,150
acres and employing around 6,000 Lao workers.
The company shipped around 4,000 tons of
rubber to China during the first month of the
CLR’s operation and planned to ship 50,000 tons
annually. This improved mode of transportation
will facilitate increased production and employment.12 The CLR is capable of generating greater
connected economic pay-offs to spur production-trade ties across the China-Laos border.
While anchored by both Kunming and

Vientiane, the CLR has been driven by the
much bigger and stronger Chinese economy
and demand from and via Kunming. Through
the first ten days of the CLR’s operation, under
pandemic-mandated border closure, 253 bidirectional passenger trains ran inside China, and 78
international freight trains from China crossed
the border, relative to only 24 bidirectional
passenger trains inside Laos and 23 freight trains
over the border into China. The daily number
of passenger trains between Kunming and
Mohan grew from 17.5 to 25.5 and the number
of daily passengers rose from an average of
20,000 to 30,000, with a cumulative number of
over 300,000 passengers up to 16 December
2021, considerably more than the corresponding
number inside Laos.13 These lopsided numbers
align with the Lao government’s rosy projection
of around 10 million passengers, mostly from
China, taking the CLR annually (Chen 2018).
With Laos opening the border to international
tourists, including from China, at the beginning
of 2022, and China’s likely loosening of outbound
international travel, the CLR is expected to draw
more Chinese tourists over the border to such
destinations as the UNESCO-designated cultural
and Buddhist heritage sites in Luang Prabang
in northern Laos. While demand for the CLR
stemming from resumed inbound tourism will
help the Lao government pay towards its large
construction loan over time, time will tell if the
current uneven distribution of passenger flows
in China’s favour will become more balanced if
more Laos and Southeast Asians take the CLR to
visit China in the future.
The CLR has also begun to draw trade cargo
from strong cross-city and trans-regional
economic and transport origins within China to
the China-Laos trading dyad, and between China
and Southeast Asia as the RCEP became effective
on 1 January 2022. Besides upgrading its own
cross-border trade and logistics connections
with neighbouring Southeast Asia, Kunming has
secured high-speed train and expressway links
with China’s major coastal and interior provinces
and cities like Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chengdu
in recent years. These fast transport connections have channelled export cargoes to ride the
CLR from Kunming. By 31 December 2021, 380

domestic freight trains had carried 150,000 tons
of cargo from Shanghai, Guangzhou, and even
Beijing to Kunming bound for Southeast Asia.14
Thus far, four freight trains destined for Vientiane
have run from Shenzhen, Nanjing, Chengdu, and
Huaihua, Hunan province to and via Kunming (see
a Nanjing-Vientiane train in Figure 5). The CLR’s
shipping network has reached nine provinces and
15 major cities within China while connecting
indirectly to Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, and
other Southeast Asian countries beyond Laos.15
This growing cargo flow from the rest of
China via Kunming and from Kunming to
Vientiane and other Southeast Asian markets is
also broadening to include more products from
more sources with the aid of more sophisticated
shipping technology. On 27 December 2021,
a freight train of 21 wagons with cold-chain
containers left the city of Yuxi near Kunming for
Vientiane. It carried various fresh vegetables in
20 containers and fresh flowers in the one other
container, the latter a distinctive export from
Yunnan, weighing over 300 tons and valued
at approximately $206,000.16 The CLR’s cargo
content is poised to diversify further and thus
enrich trade along the CLR route and beyond.
This will smooth and strengthen the longer and
wider movement of goods between China, Laos,
and Southeast Asia along the China-Indochina
Figure 5: A Vientiane-Bound Freight Train From Nanjing,
Jiangsu Province Via Kunming

Source: The Boten Special Economic Zone WeChat Platform; accessed at
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Z6F3Ub5dKVQ4UFID2EIP8w.
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Peninsula Economic Corridor (see Figure 2).
Even if Kunming and Vientiane work together
to link both passenger and freight movements
along the CLR, they may still fall short of their
combined potential, unless the CLR is seamlessly
docked with the planned China-Thailand HighSpeed Railway linking Kunming to Bangkok,
especially with the RCEP being effective.
Currently, the Laos-Thailand train connection is
confined to the old metre-gauge track left by the
French colonialists between the Thanaleng rail
station on the Lao side, away from the Vientiane
station, the CLR’s terminus south of the city, and
the Nong Khai station and land port on the Thai
side of the border defined by the Mekong River.
On 7 December 2021, the fresh vegetables that
arrived on a CLR freight train had to be picked up
at Vientiane by 33 Thai trucks from Nong Khai to
be forwarded to the rest of Thailand.17 While this
saved a lot of shipping time and cost compared
with road-only transport from China to Laos and
then to Thailand, it represents an argument for
the creation of a direct and smooth Laos-Thailand
rail connection.
The Thai government supports the building of
a 5.35-km metre-gauge rail line from Thanaleng
Station to northern Vientiane, already 70 per cent
completed, for improved near-border transport.
This solution, however, still misses a direct link
to the CLR, even though the Thai government is
planning to build a new railway bridge next to the
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge over the Mekong in
anticipation of the forthcoming direct train traffic
from the CLR to the China-Thailand Railway. This
is more urgently needed given the busy Nong Khai
border port, which saw $2 billion worth of exports
and $204 million in imports during 2021, with
over 6,000 person exits and 7,000 person entries
every day before the pandemic.18 Given this busy
border crossing, the CLR can stimulate more
road-based cross-border trade and people movements between northeast Thailand and Vientiane
and its surrounding region across the Mekong
River, even before a direct Laos-Thailand crossborder train connection.
Designed to run at 180 km/hour over 250 km
within Thailand, the high-speed railway will ultimately connect Bangkok to Nong Khai, where it
will be seamlessly docked with the CLR. Despite
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Figure 6: The China-Laos Railway In A Broader Regional Context

Source: From Yunnan Haicheng Industry Group Co., published with permission in
Chen (2020: Figure 3.4) and republished here.

a signed MOU in 2014, the agreed division of
labour between China and Laos in building the
Thai segment of the railway has been slow, due
to a military coup. After some progress in 2018,
disputes between China, Thailand, and Laos about
the project’s financing limited its construction to
the first phase and section between Bangkok and
Nakhon Ratchasima, with the entire route to be
finished and operational by 2028. This sustains
the missing link through Thailand for the CLR to
connect to Malaysia and Singapore, as envisioned
by the Trans-Asian Railway network (see Figure
6), to which 18 Asian countries signed up in 2006.
In the meantime, the CLR will not reach its full
regional connective and economic potential until
a few years from now.
From the CLR to the China-Laos Economic
Corridor and Beyond
Through its early period in operation, the CLR
has largely lived up to its expected role in stimulating and supporting trade and travel along the
emerging China-Laos Economic Corridor (CLEC).
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To foster larger and heavier movements of goods
and people along the CLEC and beyond, the CLR
needs the completion and growing function of the
Boten Special Economic Zone (BSEZ) bordering
China as a central node that can effectively
bridge and facilitate the flow of goods and people
between Kunming and Vientiane (see Figure 6).
Occupying 16.4 square km and close to completion by a Yunnan-based real estate developer, the
BSEZ is a new city with designated and specialised
roles in international finance, trade, light manufacturing, logistics, and other economic sectors,
where around 300,000 people are projected to
work and live locally. With the CLR’s launch, the
BSEZ has begun to meet the logistics and warehousing needs for through cargo, although its
passenger station has yet to open fully, due to
China’s rigid pandemic border control. In addition, a growing number of Chinese companies
have partnered with the Lao government and
businesses in light manufacturing, agri-business,
and duty-free shopping, while exploring opportunities in financial services and e-commerce in the
BSEZ. As the CLR picks up speed and runs more
evenly and frequently, the BSEZ is well positioned
to both process more freight and passenger flows
and play a strong role in extending trade and
development benefits along the CLEC. At the
CLR’s southern terminus, near Vientiane Station,
the Saysettha Development Zone (see Figure 6),
jointly developed and operated by Chinese and
Lao provincial and municipal government and
private companies, also uses the CLR to ship
assembled or lightly manufactured export products. These two special zones fit the logic of
bracketing a train-driven corridor, like the CLEC’s
Lao segment.
Finally, the CLR also runs a spur line to regional
geopolitical dynamics. In conjunction with the
BSEZ, the CLR enriches China’s rail development
statecraft into a broader bundling of infrastructure construction and delivery through the BRI.
It offers both connective (the CLR) and sited (the

BSEZ) support to the CLEC and its broader role
in strengthening the BRI corridor from China to
Southeast Asia. As the converging benefit of zero
tariffs under the RCEP takes effect, the CLEC
brings China, Laos, and other RCEP members
closer together for trade and investment under
the world’s largest free-trade agreement. This
presents a looming challenge to the Biden administration, for which Laos is a foreign policy blind
spot after President Obama visited there in 2016
and sent his Secretaries of State, Hilary Clinton
in 2012 and John Kerry twice in 2012 and 2016,19
when the ground was being broken for the CLR.
In tightening the China-Laos bond via the CLEC,
the CLR has become a winning drive for China in
terms of strengthening its hand to compete with
the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
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